نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Normative reasons now play a pivotal role in normative disciplines. Several theorists, especially within metanormative frameworks, have attempted to define or explicate concepts such as ought, obligation, rightness, goodness, and rationality in terms of normative reasons. Nevertheless, as with other substantive philosophical notions, the nature and reality of normative reasons remain deeply contested. This article critically examines the value-based theory of reasons. Broadly construed, this theory holds that evaluative concepts such as good, bad, better, and worse are more fundamental than the concept of a normative reason, and that normative reasons can be analyzed or explained in terms of such values. The discussion begins by introducing and exploring the structure of the value-based view. It then turns to a close analysis of several objections raised by Benjamin Kiesewetter, focusing especially on the critique that the theory fails to account for reasons to act in accordance with one's valid promises. In response, the article offers a range of counterarguments and strategies. The final section defends the value of promise-keeping - or the disvalue of promise-breaking - by appealing to notions such as the desire to avoid others’ blame, existential flourishing and conditional defense of deontic values. It concludes that the value-based account of reasons remains intact in the face of the alleged explanatory deficit concerning promissory reasons.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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